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Abstract
Kelo v. City of New London unleashed an unprecedented legislative response when the Court upheld the use 
of eminent domain for private economic development as consistent with the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  By exhibiting an extreme deference to the legislative branch and failing to consider the 
current model of economic development, in which “desperate” cities have seen their economic bases 
contract and have embarked on fervent urban revitalization campaigns as a result, the Kelo Court failed to 
take into account the immense influence that large corporate interests wield in the legislature.  This 
influence is generally exercised to the detriment of the interests of the average citizen whose home or small 
business is at risk of being seized on behalf of powerful private interests and in the name of economic 
development.  Unwittingly, Kelo has opened the doors for abuse of these average citizens.  
Kelo saw its precursor in the infamous 1981 Poletown decision by the Michigan Supreme Court.  
Poletown’s lessons and the Michigan Supreme Court’s subsequent reversal of it are instructive in a post-
Kelo world.  While balancing the interests of cities and states desperate to revitalize their tax bases and 
those of the average citizen who are given very little recourse in Kelo and in many legislatures, this paper 
advocates a new framework under which economic development takings may be analyzed.  
This framework comprehends a process, mandated by either the courts or by the legislature in enabling
legislation, in which Social Capital Impact Assessments (SCIA) would be used to correct the imbalance of 
power between large corporate interests and government, on the one hand, and the average citizen, on the 
other.  Successfully implemented under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Environmental 
Impact Statements and Assessments, that mandate the study of federal agencies’ actions and their impact 
on the environment, have revolutionized the influence of previously excluded environmental groups on 
environmental policy by using the courts as a mechanism for enforcement.   By implementing a process by 
which governments must respond to questions relating to the social impact of proposals that contemplate 
economic development takings and by providing opportunities for public comments, as in NEPA, the 
legislative balance-of-power implications post-Kelo may be corrected.  
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By Asmara Tekle Johnson1
I.  Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London2 (hereinafter 
Kelo), upholding a Connecticut statute3 and permitting the use of eminent domain for 
private economic development as consistent with the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution,4 spurred a level of public outrage unseen in modern 
times to prior rulings of the Court.5   As a result of this outrage, a flurry of proposed 
state6 and federal7 legislation ensued in an effort to counteract the effects of the Court's 
decision in Kelo.   
1
 The author is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern 
University.  J.D., 2000, Cornell Law School; A.B. cum laude, 1995 Harvard College. The author would like to 
thank the gracious assistance of Fabiola Cagigal-Acciarri, Tom Kleven, Walter Champion, Timothy Johnson, 
J’Antae D. Hall, Richard Bender, Marcia Johnson, and Martin Levy. 
2 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).  Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.  Justice O’Connor authored a dissenting opinion in 
which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas joined.  Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, and 
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion.  
3
 The relevant Connecticut statute includes a “determination of policy” stating that the acquisition of land by 
eminent domain for “the continued growth of business and industry,” or economic development, in Connecticut 
is a “public use” in the “public interest.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 et seq. (2006).
4
 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. art. V.  The current test for whether the exercise of eminent domain 
satisfies the “public use” portion of the Fifth Amendment is whether or not the exercise has a “public purpose.”  
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662-63; see also Fallbrook Irrigation Distr. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896).  
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a strict interpretation of “public use,” or a definition that comprehends 
the exercise of eminent domain only if the real property seized will be used by the public. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 
2633.   
5 See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at B2; see also 
Timothy Egan, Rulings Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A12. 
6
 At last count, approximately 39 states had introduced legislation to limit the use of eminent domain for private 
economic development in response to Kelo. See John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1.  For instance, in California alone, five constitutional amendments and six 
proposed pieces of legislation have been put before the California Legislature to counter the Court’s decision in 
Kelo. Id.  In Texas, the legislature acted swiftly and banned the use of eminent domain on behalf of a private 
party, except for certain uses. Id.   Among these exceptions is the taking of land for a new stadium for the Dallas 
Cowboys football team. Id.  In addition, in Ohio, the legislature placed a one-year moratorium on all takings 
soon after the Kelo ruling. See id.; see also Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA TODAY, Feb. 
20, 2006, at 1A (noting the one-year moratorium in Ohio); see generally Terry Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine 
a World Without Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at C5 (discussing different measures that states 
have taken in response to Kelo and noting the opposition to the legislative groundswell from developers, some 
lawmakers, and the real estate community).
7
 As of November 30, 2005, legislation was passed by Congress and signed into law by the President that makes 
appropriations for certain government agencies and provides that no funds shall be used for federal, state, or local 
projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain for economic development that would primarily benefit 
private parties. See Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of 
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396, 
2494-2495 (2005).  Furthermore, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed H.R. 4128, a bill that 
4Economic development in the context of eminent domain generally refers to the 
government’s taking property and its transferring title to a private party with the 
understanding that development of the property will yield public benefits, such as 
increased tax revenue or additional employment opportunities.8   In upholding the use of 
eminent domain for economic development, the Court also reasoned that economic 
development satisfied the Fifth Amendment's "public purpose" test, so long as the 
development is part of an “integrated”9 or “comprehensive redevelopment”10 plan that 
will yield increased benefits to the community in the form of increased property tax, sales 
tax revenue, and more employment opportunities.11
Kelo should be evaluated in light of two contemporary guideposts.  The first 
guidepost is the abiding economic reality of many “desperate” cities and states.  Over the 
past two decades, cities have seen their economic bases contract, resulting in a loss of 
higher-income taxpayers and an increase in the number of lower-income residents who 
have a higher demand for city services.12   Indeed, cities run on the “lifeblood” of 
property and sales tax revenues.13
This reality was dramatically reflected in the Kelo case itself, as the city of New 
London was generally thought of as an “economically distressed” city.14   City leaders in 
New London were desperate to raise additional revenues, as the Federal Government had 
closed the doors of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in 1996, resulting in a loss of 
over 1,500 jobs.15   In addition, New London’s unemployment rate was almost twice that 
of Connecticut’s in 1998, prompting concern from civic and state leaders and spurring the 
plan for the development of the Fort Trumbull area at issue in Kelo.16
Fort Trumbull is an area located on the waterfront of New London, a feature of its 
location that had attracted Pfizer Inc. to build a $300 million research facility on land 
adjacent to the neighborhood.17   It is estimated that the development and construction of 
proposes to prevent states and their political subdivisions from receiving federal economic development funds 
for two years if a court of competent jurisdiction rules that eminent domain has been used for economic 
development. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).  The same 
legislation also allows not only for individuals to sue local or federal government to enforce any provision of the 
proposed law, but also for the awarding of attorney’s fees should a plaintiff prevail. Id. § 4(a), (c).  It also 
prevents the federal government from using eminent domain for economic development. Id. § 3.  The proposed 
law broadly defines economic development as, “taking private property, without the consent of the owner, and 
conveying or leasing such property from one private person or entity to another private person or entity for 
commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general 
economic health . . . .” Id. § 8(1).  
8
 Rachel A. Lewis, Note, Strike That, Reverse It:  County of Wayne v. Hathcock:  Michigan Redefines 
Implementing Economic Development Through Eminent Domain, 50 VILL. L. REV. 341, 342-43 (2005).   
9 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.  
10 Id. at 2668.
11 Id. at 2665.
12 MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, THE BROOKINGS INST., DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE:  A 
PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION AND POLICY CHOICES (2001), 
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/gentrification/gentrification.pdf. 
13 Id.
14
 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004).
15 Kelo, 1125 S. Ct. at 2658.
16 Id. at 2658-59.
17 Id.
5the Pfizer facility has resulted in 2,000 additional and largely high-paying jobs to the 
area.18
The other guidepost in the contemporary context in which Kelo should be 
examined is the current phenomenon, dating from the 1990’s, of the revitalization of 
many of the United States’s previously forgotten and decrepit inner cities and downtown 
areas.19  “Urban revitalization,” also known as “urban redevelopment” and 
“gentrification”  is  “the process of neighborhood change that results in the replacement 
of lower income residents with higher income ones.”20    A new cadre of mayors and 
other city leaders have placed attracting higher-income residents to the inner cities and 
downtowns at the top of their municipal agendas, in an attempt to rejuvenate tax revenues 
and neighborhoods, and ultimately to bring renewed life back to their downtowns areas,21
precisely for the reasons stated by the city of New London in Kelo. Municipal leaders’ 
efforts have been aided by the fact that many downtowns have a large number of 
attractive features to future residents, including unique architecture, the availability of 
land parcels along waterfronts, as in the Fort Trumbull area in Kelo,  thriving cultural and 
arts scenes, easy access to health care, universities, colleges, and jobs.22
This contemporary model of urban redevelopment is in direct contrast to the 
model of the 1940’s, 1950’s, and 1960’s, when urban redevelopment was initiated and 
pursued almost exclusively by the government.23   Urban redevelopment efforts 
diminished in the 1970’s and 1980’s, only to be resurrected in the 1990’s through a new 
model that involved public and private partnerships, with heavy emphasis on the private.  
In the context of this contemporary model of eminent domain for economic 
development, it is imperative that a new analytical framework be used to examine takings 
for economic development.  The framework posed by the Supreme Court in Kelo fails to 
take into account the current wave of urban development and the effects that this 
phenomenon is having on ordinary citizens24 who live in areas targeted for urban
redevelopment, but who lack the requisite political connections to prevent their home or 
small business from being seized.   History belies the notion that powerful private 
18 Id.; see also Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1.  The 
benefit to attracting high-paying jobs is the prospect of additional sales and income tax revenue to the city and 
state governments.
19
 Cities in which urban redevelopment is taking place at an accelerated rate include San Francisco, Boston, 
Seattle, Chicago, Portland, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Denver, Cleveland, and Detroit.  See KENNEDY &
LEONARD, supra note 12, at 1; see also EUGENIE L. BIRCH, THE BROOKINGS INST., WHO LIVES DOWNTOWN 1 
(2005), http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051115_Birch.pdf, (stating that “during the 1990s, downtown 
population grew by 10 percent, a marked resurgence following 20 years of overall decline.”).
20 See KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 12, at 1.
21 Id.
22 See BIRCH, supra note 19, at 1.
23
 At its inception, urban renewal was heavily pursued by mayors of cities who wished to compete with the 
suburbs and to revitalize the inner cities.  In order to achieve this goal, mayors sought funding for their initiatives 
from the federal government.  Business coalitions took a direct hand in helping mayors push legislation through 
Congress, each time requiring more and more federal funds.  Over time the funding for renewal projects came 
not from federal funds, but from private interests as these interests realized the potential for profit of their 
investments.  BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC. HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES
22-33 (1990).
24
 For purposes of this article, reference to the “average citizen,” “average resident,” or “average American” is 
not exclusive of persons in the United States having United States citizenship or permanent residency in the 
United States, but inclusive of landowners living and owning real property in the United States, whether for their 
home, business, or investment purposes, regardless of their citizenship or residency status.
6interests often dictate the terms of economic development and, ultimately, the use of 
eminent domain for revitalization projects.    
Accordingly, this paper will advocate for a new framework that empowers the 
average homeowner or small business owner who may face eminent domain as part of an 
economic development project, but who lacks the political power to influence or to halt 
such an undertaking.  Part II of this article will examine the Kelo opinion.  Part III will 
explore the inequities in power between large primarily corporate interests and average 
citizens in economic development takings and the attendant economic and political 
subsidies in favor of large corporate interests at the expense of the average home and 
small business owner, using Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit25 as a 
backdrop to this study.   Part IV of this article will investigate reasons for a new 
analytical framework using contemporary and past examples of economic development
takings, introduce this new schema, and propose additional solutions that may benefit the 
average citizen landowner, large private interests, and government.  Part V will conclude 
this paper.   
II. A Critical Look at the Main Tenets of Kelo
Kelo has radically changed the landscape of eminent domain law, by upholding 
general economic development as a “public use” under the Fifth Amendment, though that 
development may benefit private parties directly, notwithstanding public benefits of 
increased tax revenues and more jobs.  In Kelo, the Supreme Court majority relied 
heavily on Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff26 and Berman v. Parker.27  In Midkiff, the 
Supreme Court upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause, a state statute 
authorizing eminent domain for the transfer of title to real property from owners to 
renters as a way to break up the oligarchic concentration of land ownership in Hawaii and
to infuse normal market conditions in the real estate market in Hawaii.  In Berman, the 
Court similarly approved a law as constitutional under the “public use”  provision of the 
Fifth Amendment that authorized Congress to use eminent domain and give land to 
private developers because of a “balanced, integrated [redevelopment] plan”28 that 
existed to clear the targeted area of slums and blight.  In Congress’ estimation, there was 
a threat to the “public health, safety, and morals”29 of the residents as a result of the 
substandard housing and lack of adequate sanitation facilities, such as running water and 
indoor toilets.
In the majority opinion of Kelo, Justice Stevens noted that there is a single 
overarching requirement for an economic development taking to pass muster under the 
Fifth Amendment:  the requirement of an “integrated,”30 “comprehensive,”31 or “carefully 
25
 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
26
 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
27
 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28 Id. at 34.  
29 Id. at 28.
30 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
31 Id. at 2668.
7considered”32 economic development plan. Although the Court first made several 
references to this “balanced, integrated plan”33 requirement in Berman, it appears, 
however, that the Kelo Court has established this factor as the premier requisite for an 
economic development taking to be constitutional by its consistent mention of this type 
of plan throughout the opinion.34  Moreover, although in Berman, the Court attempted to 
outline the contours of a “balanced, integrated plan” by noting that it would have to 
include “new homes, schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers,” in the hope 
that the plan would halt the “cycle of decay” of slum-ridden neighborhoods, the Kelo 
Court failed to allude to or to require such specific qualifications.35   Indeed, without 
defining any terms, the most specific delineation of an integrated or comprehensive 
development plan that Kelo gives is one that will “provide appreciable benefits to the 
community,” such as additional jobs and tax revenue, as well as the hope that a city’s 
plan will “coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of 
land,”36 such that the plan “will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts.”37  In 
addition, the Court specifically declined to review the effectiveness of the economic 
development plan put forward by the city of New London.38
Outside of an almost exact replica of the economic plan for the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood in Kelo, little guidance and detail are provided to municipal and state 
leaders and legal departments of these institutions, developers, real estate professionals, 
and large private interests, regarding what would constitute a constitutional economic 
development plan that includes takings.  Furthermore, this lack of clarity not only 
provides little comfort to ordinary citizens whose property may be subject to takings, 
however amorphous or ineffective the plan may be, but also the opaqueness of Kelo 
opinion, with respect to constitutional criteria for an economic development plan, opens 
up the door wide to abuse of citizens. 
A second noteworthy element of the Kelo decision is that the Court re-affirmed 
the Court’s precedent, from Midkiff, that the standard of review for takings statutes is 
rational basis.39  The rational basis test involves the courts’ examining whether the State 
is using a rational means to achieve a legitimate purpose.40  Indeed, Justice Kennedy 
noted in his concurrence to Kelo that reviewing these cases on a case-by-case basis, 
rational review is likely the only basis on which the Court should review the majority of 
takings statutes, outside of an examination by the Court to determine whether  a taking is 
“intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public 
benefits.”41
32 Id. at 2661.
33 Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n.13 (referencing the “balanced, and integrated” 
plan in Berman).
34 See infra notes 35-36; see also generally Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-68.
35
 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-68.
36
 The development plan included seven parcels of land, each of which was to be designated for a conference 
hotel that was to be located at the center of restaurants and shopping, a recreational and commercial marina, a 
riverwalk, residences, office space, support facilities for the nearby state park, the marina, and shopping, 
respectively. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2559.
37 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
38 Id. at 2668.
39 See id. at 2667.
40 Id. (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
41 Id. at 2669.  Justice Kennedy, however, also noted that there may be some instances in which eminent domain 
has been used to promote economic development in which a heightened standard of review is warranted, but he 
8By far however, the most important element of Kelo is the Court’s express and 
extreme deference to state and federal legislatures on the issue of whether or not eminent 
domain should be used for purposes of economic development.  Indeed, the Court 
underscored the legislative deference exhibited by Berman by leaving to the legislative 
branch questions of what and how much land should be included in an economic 
redevelopment plan, including where the boundaries should lie for a project, and whether 
or not a plan is actually effective in practice.42   The Court seemingly empathized with 
those experiencing the “hardship”43 of eminent domain by counseling them to avail 
themselves of the legislative process.  Practically however, the Court’s advice amounted 
to suggesting that concerned citizens lobby state legislative representatives for laws that 
would restrict a state’s authorization of eminent domain power for economic 
development.44
A. A Line in the Sand - What the Kelo Majority Opinion Refused to Do
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Kelo explicitly rejected three arguments 
advanced by the Petitioners in support of their contention that the Connecticut law at 
issue in Kelo was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.  First, the Petitioners 
argued for a bright-line rule that would “stop a city from transferring Citizen A’s property 
to Citizen B for the sole reason that Citizen B will put the property to a more productive 
use and thus pay more taxes.”45  The Court specifically declined to declare such a rule, 
noting that it would artificially restrict what governments can and cannot do under the 
Public Use Clause.46
Secondly, the Court refused to evaluate the economic development plan under 
which eminent domain was exercised by the city of New London, both for its proposed 
effectiveness in securing the public benefits of higher tax revenue, increased jobs, and for 
New London’s determinations regarding the lands needed for the plan.47  In connection 
with this argument, the Court, as a third matter, explicitly rejected the Petitioners’ request 
to review Connecticut’s judgment of the need for a plan of economic revitalization to 
declined to specify those instances. Id. at 2670.  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence only reinforces the problems in 
the majority opinion, especially with respect to the amount of influence large private interests may have on a 
particular economic development project. See infra Parts III.A.-B. notes 66-80.
42 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 “It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of 
the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area.  Once the question of the public 
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a 
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”).
43 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
44 See id. (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its 
exercise of the takings power.  Indeed, many States already impose “public use” requirements that are stricter 
than the federal baseline.  Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional 
law, while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which 
takings may be exercised.”); see also Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground:  Using Eminent 
Domain for Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1867-70 (2005) (discussing that “[w]hen 
landowners are unhappy with the land use decisions being made by the legislature on their behalf, they are free to 
elect new representatives or to vote with their feet by moving to a new locality with land use laws that they 
prefer.”).
45 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.  
46 See id.
47 See id. at 2668.
9satisfy certain public needs for the city of New London.48   The Court reasoned that 
precedent, dating from Berman, bound it to respect the decisions of the legislative branch 
of Connecticut.49
B. The Kelo Dissent
Although the majority relied on Midkiff and Berman as the underpinnings of the 
its decision, Justice O’Connor’s dissent distinguished these cases by noting that the land 
taken in them, albeit transferred to private hands, was mitigated by the takings’ directly 
resulting in a benefit to the public.50  In Midkiff, the direct benefit to the public was the 
dismantling of an oligarchic system of land ownership that resulted in a skewed real 
property market in Hawaii.  Similarly, in Berman, the takings directly benefited the 
public by clearing an area of slums in Washington, D.C. that in its entirety was a menace 
to public health and safety.  In contrast, in Kelo, there was no equivalent “social harm.”51
In contrast, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion countered that precedent did not 
mandate that the taking result in a direct benefit to the public, but that there be some
benefit to the public, even if the land acquired by a taking may be transferred to private 
hands.  The majority opinion essentially upheld a more attenuated, if not ethereal or 
theoretical, notion of public benefit.  For instance, in Kelo, the takings did not result in 
any direct benefit to the community, as the homes themselves were well-maintained and 
there was no oligarchy of land ownership.  Instead the plan itself, once developed, was 
pregnant with the hope that increased revenues, jobs, and momentum for the city of New 
London would result in an indirect public benefit.  The majority, thus, upheld the hope of 
indirect public benefits.
Moreover, Justice O’Connor identified three categories of takings that the Court 
has stated historically conformed to the requirements of the Public Use Clause.  The first 
category is one in which the government may convey private property that it has acquired 
through eminent domain to “public ownership” for “a road, a hospital, or a military 
base.”52  The second category includes the government’s transferring private property 
acquired through a taking to private parties, “often common carriers, who make the 
property available for the public’s use-such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a 
stadium.”53  The third category that Justice O’Connor outlined includes those instances, 
existing under “certain circumstances” and meeting “certain exigencies,” for which 
“public ownership” under category one and “use-by-the-public” under category two, are 
48 See id. at 2664.
49 See id. at 2668.
50 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674.
51 Id. at 2675.  In response, the majority opinion of Kelo noted that Justice O’Connor’s dissent confused the 
“purpose of a taking with its mechanics.” Id. at 2666 n.16.  The majority opinion observed that Justice O’Conner, 
in her dissent, failed to follow precedent by interpreting the notion that there had to be a social harm before 
property could be taken and transferred to a private party.  Instead, the majority countered that it is “future use” 
of a taking that is relevant to the public purpose test, and that just because the mechanics of a situation entail a 
private party securing title to land, a public purpose may still be achieved, presumably in the form of increased 
tax revenues and jobs.  See id.
52 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (emphasis added); see also Lewis, supra note 8, at 364-70 (identifying three 
categories of “public use”).  
53 Id. (emphasis added).
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unworkable under the Public Use Clause.54  According to Justice O’Connor, until Kelo, 
only Berman and Midkiff had met the requirements of this third category because the pre-
condemnation uses of the targeted land in those cases were ones that resulted in 
“affirmative harm on society.”55
In comparison, Justice Thomas, in his dissent, went several steps further by 
advocating for a return to a strict interpretation of the Public Use Clause in vogue in some 
states at the nation’s founding.  This strict interpretation is one in which the government 
may take private property only if it will use it, or if the public has a legal right to use the 
land.56   Justice Thomas also wrote that the Kelo Court has expanded the Public Use 
Clause to such an extent by sanctioning economic development as a proper public use, 
that it has effectively eviscerated the Clause.57
In analyzing the majority opinion, Justice Thomas reiterated the criticism that the 
majority has created an illusory test that essentially ignores the motive for the economic 
development.  Reflecting the concerns that the Michigan Supreme Court noted in County 
of Wayne v. Hathcock,58 in which it clairvoyantly disavowed the reasoning set forth by 
the majority in Kelo, Justice Thomas wrote that, in the sphere of economic development, 
private and tangential public benefit are fused and “mutually reinforcing.”59  Regardless 
of the motive behind an economic development taking, it would be difficult to 
“disaggregate” Pfizer’s or the developer’s private economic benefit from any promised 
public benefits of increases in jobs or tax revenues.60
A second limitation that Justice Thomas found in the majority opinion is that 
governments’ choosing to use eminent domain for economic development will put it in 
the business of “upgrading” real property.  Under Kelo, government now has additional 
incentives to take property on behalf of private owners who intend to put it to more 
profitable use, not only for the landowner herself, but also for the state.  As the 
landowner’s profit increases, this profit may be passed along to the state in the form of 
higher property, sales, and income tax revenue.61
Finally, Justice Thomas admonished the majority for failing to intervene 
judicially in the Kelo holding because the decision ultimately rests on the backs of those 
least able to put their property to those uses that would yield the greatest economic 
benefits to the government and who are least politically connected.62  Sadly, America’s 
history illustrates that more often than not when eminent domain has been used to re-
develop communities, the “leasts” in society are predominantly lower-income, racial 
minorities, and the elderly.63
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2673-74.  
56 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679; see also id. at 2681-83.    
57 Id. at 2678 (discussing that “[i]f such ‘economic development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and 
the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution.”). 
58
 684 N.W. 2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
59 Id. at 2676.  
60 Id.
61 Id. (noting that “[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home 
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”).  
62 Id. at 2686-87.
63 Id. at 2787; see also generally Wendell H. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight:  Urban Renewal and the 
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L.& POL’Y REV. 1 (2003); Berliner, infra note 127, at 185.     
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III. Advantage:  Corporations, Kelo Analyzed and Applied to Current Economic 
Development Takings
This paper finds the arguments advanced by the Kelo dissent ultimately more 
convincing, more grounded in reality, and, ultimately, more just. The majority’s refusal 
to hold in favor of the Petitioners, really stand-ins for the average citizen, and instead rely 
on the effete and unrealistic notion that state legislatures, often composed of 
representatives elected and supported, in no small part, from donations made by large and 
powerful corporate interests, reflects a view of American democracy that is woefully out-
of-step with current realities of the legislative process in many states.64  This view is 
particularly outdated, given the two important guideposts influencing the contemporary 
urban planning environment:65  1)  “desperate” cities that are in dire need, or believe they 
are in great need, of additional tax revenues that make up the lifeblood of their 
communities; and 2)  the current explosion of “Downtown, Inc.,” or the strategy of 
securing additional tax revenues by attracting higher-income individuals to live, work,  
and play in previously neglected, but culturally and historically rich inner-city cores.  The 
effect is to displace lower-income residents who can no longer afford to live in these 
redeveloped areas.  
A. Extreme Influence
In the context of this model of urban redevelopment, it is often large corporate 
interests with powerful political connections that are the largely “unmistakable guiding 
and sustaining hand, indeed controlling hand”66 behind the government’s use of eminent 
domain for economic development.  There are several reasons for this line of thought.  
First, “desperate” cities, those such as New London in Kelo that face an economic 
drain, ironically enough do not have the leverage to negotiate terms of these economic 
development projects that would preserve long-standing communities or small 
businesses.  Cities’ and states’ negotiating leverage is diminished markedly in the face of 
a corporate threat, veiled or unveiled, to locate its development and attendant promises of 
increased real estate, sales, and income tax revenue and jobs to a more accommodating 
locale.    Second, this “desperate” environment in which many governments find 
themselves, combined with the revitalization explosion of many of America’s inner 
cities, puts the advantage decidedly in the court of large corporations or other large 
private interests.  
In addition, the notion of a powerful “sustaining hand” of large corporate interests 
at the local or state level is grounded in American political theory.67  This theory
indicates that there is an inverse relationship between the size of the unit of the 
64 See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1868 (supporting the notion that the legislature is the primary forum for 
economic development takings and that should landowners disagree with takings laws “they are free to elect new 
representatives or to vote with their feet by moving to a new locality with land use laws that they prefer.”).
65 See Part I., supra notes 12-22.  
66
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 468 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).  
67 See Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 409, 432 (1983).  
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government and the risk of the abuse of power.68  As the government unit decreases in 
size, the risk of abuse of power increases.69  For this reason, several courts and 
commentators have called for the abolition of the doctrine of separation of powers with 
respect to land use decisions by municipalities.70
B. Increased Risk of Abuse of Power
 Several arguments have been advanced in support of the idea that there is an 
increased risk of abuse of power at the local level.71   One contention is that municipal 
development corporations, such as the New London Development Corporation that was 
the condemning authority in Kelo, lack objectivity because they invest substantial “time, 
expertise, and money in designing public projects.”72  There is a vested interest on the 
part of these economic development corporations for the drawn-up plans to succeed.  
Furthermore, outside of the judicial system, there is generally no authority that 
impartially reviews the plans and decisions of municipal development corporations.73   A 
second contention is that at a more basic level, precisely because of the “desperate” 
situation in which local officials often find themselves, they are simply more susceptible 
to large-scale private interests and their associates, such as large corporations, developers, 
and real estate interests, who overpower local officials.74
Additionally, at the state levels, cities and the “sustaining hand” of large corporate 
interests that curry more political favor with state legislators often seek eminent domain 
friendly statutes that favor the use of economic development takings to the exclusion of, 
and at the expense of, the average citizen and taxpayer.  An economic view of the law 
bears out this theory.  Judge Posner75 explains this behavior by noting that all people “in 
all of their activities” are “rational maximizers of their satisfactions, including the 
“legislator deciding whether to vote for or against a bill.”76   The public interest seldom 
motivates legislators, but their desire to be elected or re-elected does.77  Money is often 
68 Id. 
69 Id.
70 Id. at 433 (citing Fasano v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973)), overruled on other grounds, Neuberger 
v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980), that overruled a zoning board’s decision to approve a developer’s 
plan to rezone an area because “zoning decisions by local governing boards” are not “legislative acts . . . to be 
shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers,” and equating a taking to be 
“quasi-judicial in nature” that “militates against a presumption of validity when a court hears a judicial 
challenge.”).  
71 Id.
72 Id. at 434.  
73 Id.
74 See id. at 435.  
75
 Judge Richard A. Posner sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and he has written a 
number of books and authored countless law review articles.  In Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas 
Pension Fun v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d 1339 (1992), Judge Posner, writing for the majority regarding 
tax legislation, similarly noted that “[m]uch modern legislation involves targeting government largesse on 
politically influential groups and the burdens of government on politically impotent ones.  Not infrequently the 
legislation benefits a tiny handful of individuals or firms or even a single firm . . . .”  
76 RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS WITH JURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990).
77 Id. at 354.  
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the most necessary tool for pursuing a campaign that will secure the election or re-
election of legislators, money that is “more likely” to come from “well-organized groups 
than from unorganized individuals.”78
Judge Posner further elaborates by stating that: 
The rational individual knows that his contribution 
is unlikely to make a difference; for this reason 
and also because voters in most elections are 
voting for candidates rather than policies, which 
further weakens the link between casting one’s 
vote and obtaining one’s preferred policy, the 
rational individual will have little incentive to 
invest time and effort in deciding whom to vote 
for.  Only an organized group of individuals (or 
firms or other organizations-but these are conduits 
for individuals) will be able to overcome the 
informational and free-rider problems that plague 
collective action.  But such a group will not 
organize and act effectively unless its members 
have much to gain or much to lose from specific 
policies, as tobacco farmers, for example, have 
much to gain from federal subsidies from growing 
tobacco and much to lose from the withdrawal of 
those subsidies.  The basic tactic of an interest 
group is to trade the votes of its members and its 
financial support to candidates in exchange for an 
implied promise of favorable legislation.79
Posner would reason that most plaintiffs who seek to defeat economic development 
takings are individual homeowners, such as the nine petitioners in Kelo and the members 
of the Poletown Neighborhood Council in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit.80
Sadly, these groups that must stand against city and corporate giants are often too 
small and have too little time before a plan or action is taken to seize their property to 
organize effectively.81  Moreover, the impetus to organize is even further destroyed when 
78 POSNER, supra note 76, at 354; see also Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:  County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 
Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (2004) (stating 
that “[l]ittle prevents municipalities and private interests from abusing the system.  Both corporate interests and 
political leaders dependent on their support have tremendous incentives to overestimate the economic benefits of 
projects furthered by condemnation.”) (emphasis added).
79 POSNER, supra note 76, at 354; see also Somin, supra note 78, at 1015 (noting that there is an “unjustified 
faith” in the political process and emphasizing that the process currently justifies less deference by the courts);
see also Ilya Somin, Posner’s Democratic Pragmatism, 16 CRITICAL REV. 1 (2004) (echoing Posner’s arguments 
regarding how interest groups are able to take advantage of the political process, and arguing for increased 
judicial review).  
80
 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take statute that allowed the city of Detroit to take 
land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto 
plant because the public benefits promised by the plant were substantial); see also Part III.D., infra notes 89-114. 
81 But see Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1868 (refuting the notion that landowners may organize effectively 
because economic development projects often involve the assembling numerous parcels of land, owned by 
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one considers that some landowners may support the economic development because of 
the economic gains to themselves individually.  For instance, the Poletown Neighborhood 
Council suffered from this fate--it failed to unite the Polish-American community in 
Detroit because many residents believed that they would benefit from the new Cadillac 
plant by having additional job opportunities.82   Moreover, the Poletown Neighborhood 
Council failed to gain the support of Poletown’s African-American residents, many of 
whom pointed out that in previous urban re-development projects, Polish-American
residents of other neighborhoods failed to support them and many “knew a good 
[economic] deal [on its face] when they saw one.”83
In addition, the short amount of time that accompanies many economic 
development takings, such as those in Poletown under Michigan’s quick-take statute, 
necessarily dictates that any groups will be largely short-lived.  In contrast to large 
private interests, including corporations, developers, and other real estate interests that 
know there is some degree of permanence in their ventures and therefore form politically 
effective interest groups to influence politicians regarding these ventures, homeowners 
and small businesspersons faced with an economic development taking have no reason to 
form a lasting alliance between themselves or others.84
Not only does the average citizen lack the requisite political power to stop 
economic development takings legislation at the state level and the requisite political 
power to stop the actual taking at the municipal level, but also there is little practical 
recourse to be found in the courts.  To mount a lawsuit contesting the eminent domain 
taking and perhaps to continue litigation until the exhaustion of all appeals against often 
well-financed and organized municipal and perhaps state legal offices, is an undertaking 
that most average Americans faced with the prospect of losing their home or small 
business simply cannot afford.85  For example, the homeowners in Kelo were able to 
mount and continue their judicial attack to the highest levels of the American judicial 
system only because they were represented by the Institute of Justice, a non-profit law
firm.86
C.  Economic Subsidies
different landowners in close proximity and who are bound to be displaced by the project, thus strengthening the 
bonds that would facilitate landowners’ stance as a united group in opposition to the takings).   
82 See BRYAN D. JONES & LYNN W. BACHELOR, THE SUSTAINING HAND 155 (1986). But see Gallagher, supra 
note 44, at 1868 (discussing that residents in Poletown banded together to form the Poletown Neighborhood 
Council to contest the takings and noting that, in Kelo, property owners who opposed the takings organized to 
file a lawsuit).  It should be noted, however, that there were only 10 Kelo landowners who filed suit, thus 
minimizing the effect that the group may have had, given its small numbers, regardless of how tightly organized 
it was.       
83 Id.; see also Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 471 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting that the community-at-large failed to 
mobilize behind the Poletown Neighborhood Council because of “[t]he promise of new tax revenues, retention of 
a mighty GM manufacturing facility in the heart of Detroit, new opportunities for satellite businesses, retention 
of 6,000 or more jobs, and concomitant reduction of unemployment, all fostered a community-wide chorus of 
support for the project.”). 
84Mansnerus, supra note 67, at 436.
85 See Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause and the Erosion of 
the “Public Use” Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543, 573 (2002) (“Private landowners are at a disadvantage 
fighting against cities with vast taxpayer revenues to pay good attorneys and to appeal rulings.  If a single private 
landowner’s property is taken, she may not have the money to challenge the city’s action in court.”).  
86Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
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Ironically, the average citizen, including those whose homes and small businesses 
are taken, ends up paying twice, a sort of double taxation, for the privilege.  The first time 
he or she “pays” is through the seizure of his or her house and livelihood. The second 
time is through tax dollars that often pay to subsidize the economic development behind 
which already wealthy corporate interests are the “sustaining hand.”  This second level of 
“taxation” in economic development takings often comes in the form of tax dollars spent 
to purchase the land under eminent domain, bonds or other debt issued that all levels of 
government, including local, state, and federal, must service to pay for the purchase of 
the land, or certain promises made by the government as part of the economic 
development deal.   A third level of “taxation” may occur should a rare landowner 
expend resources in attorney’s fees and court costs to seek recourse in the judicial 
system.
Furthermore, large corporate interests are economically subsidized by not having 
to bid on the private, competitive real estate market for the land that is taken and paying
market prices for its acquisition.87  This subsidy, in combination with ones associated 
with the second level of taxation above, result in those with the most resources benefiting 
economically at the expense of those with the least economic means. 
 Paradoxically, it is also the more desperate cities that end up paying the most in 
subsidies to attract large corporate interests, and the wealthiest corporations that end up 
receiving the largest concessions.88  Like a child, therefore, who runs to his parent to
protect him from a fight with a bully, large corporate interests run to the government to 
shield them from the economic pain of the open market. 
D.  History Repeats Itself:  Poletown, the Kelo of Its Day
Judge Ryan, one of the dissenting judges in Poletown, wrote tellingly in his 1981 
dissenting opinion that “the reverberating clang of its [Poletown’s] economic, 
sociological, political, and jurisprudential impact is likely to be heard and felt for 
generations.”89  The Poletown clang has now been replaced by the sonic boom of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, a decision that parallels Poletown almost 25 years 
later, but whose effects will ultimately be more far-reaching and likely longer lasting.   
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld in Poletown, a Michigan “quick-
take” statute that authorized municipalities to use eminent domain for economic 
development.    In practice, this quick-take statute90 allowed the city of Detroit to take 
Poletown, a historic neighborhood composed primarily of 3,438 lower-class elderly 
87
 Kruckeberg, supra note 85, at 579 (2002) (discussing the notion that corporations should be prevented from 
having to go “outside of the open market.”). 
88
 John J. Bukowczyk, The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. G.M. and the City of 
Detroit, 41WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 70 (1984) (quoting Bachelor, supra note 82, at 48) (“ . . . those cities most 
in need of increased revenues are likely to make the greatest overpayments, and those corporations with the 
greatest profit margins are likely to receive the largest surpluses from them.”).  
89 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464-65 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
90
 The “quick-take” statute allowed for faster takings, “making the process easier for both the condemning 
authority and the ultimate owner.” Mansnerus, supra note 67, at 435; see also Rocco C. Nunzio, Note, Eminent 
Domain:  Private Corporations and the Public Use Limitation, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 310, 319 & n. 89 (1982),
and Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455 at 461 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).    
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residents of Polish descent and African-Americans for the construction of a new $500 
million dollar Cadillac plant91 by General Motors (GM).  The plant was to cost nearly 
$200,000,000 to local, state, and federal taxpayers, and GM and Detroit promised 6150 
auto-manufacturing jobs and $15 million in property tax revenues.92
Like the city of New London in Kelo, Detroit made the case that it was in dire 
economic straits.  One of the dissenting opinions in Poletown noted 
[w]hile unemployment is high throughout the nation, it is of 
calamitous proportions throughout the state of Michigan, 
and particularly in the City of Detroit, whose economic 
lifeblood is the now foundering automobile industry.  It is 
difficult to overstate the magnitude of this crisis.  
Unemployment in the state of Michigan is 14.2%.  In the 
City of Detroit it is at 18%, and among black citizens it is 
almost 30%.93
Therefore, unemployment is often the bait to lure judicial approval in economic 
development takings.
Moreover, like New London in Kelo, Detroit in Poletown justified the use of 
eminent domain for the construction of a new General Motors Cadillac plant by pointing 
to its dismal economic statistics.94   Although the kind of economic development pursued 
in each case differed, with Kelo having a large-scale mixed commercial/residential 
project, and Poletown having the GM manufacturing plant, both cases had similar 
intended benefits to the public:  the retention of or new jobs, more tax revenue, and spill-
off reconstruction into the community.   In each instance, however, a small group of 
average citizen residents who lacked political and economic influence, were pitted 
against City Hall and the large powerful interests standing with them.  
91
 Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 61.  
92 Id. at 464 n.15, 467; see also JONES AND BACHELOR, supra note 82, at 138-39,
and JEANIE WYLIE,  POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 52 (1989) (noting that the social cost to the Poletown
takings was the clearance of 1,400 homes, 144 businesses, and 16 churches and that estimates the actual cost to 
taxpayers was over $300,000,000); see also Somin, supra note 78, at 1017 (analyzing the social and economic 
costs to the taking of the Poletown neighborhood and arguing that with the closing of small businesses located in 
Poletown as a result of the takings, Detroit actually suffered a net job loss and that the condemnation of the 
neighborhood “did the people of Detroit more harm than good”); see also Somin, supra note 78, at 1018 
(confirming that $150 million of taxpayer money expended on the Poletown project came from federal loans and 
grants and state taxpayer funds were responsible for $30 million of the budget); but cf. Jenny Nolan, Auto Plant 
vs. Neighborhood: The Poletown Battle, DETROIT NEWS,
http://info.detnews.com/history/story/index.cfm?id=18&category=business (referencing a study from University 
of Michigan that showed that “87% of the former Poletown residents older than 60 and 84 percent of younger 
former residents were happy in their new homes.”).  That most residents of Poletown were in time “happy” in 
their new neighborhoods, however, bears no relevance to the issue of whether or not eminent domain should 
have been used to construct the GM plant.  Also, the psychological effects of forced relocation have been 
documented, noting that in one community 46% of adult females and 38 % of adult males underwent “a fairly 
severe grief reaction or worse.” HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS:  GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE OF 
ITALIAN-AMERICANS 379 (2d ed. The Free Press 1982); see also Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 62.
93 Poletown, 304 N.W. 2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).    
94 See id. at 459 (“In this regard the city presented substantial evidence of the severe economic conditions facing 
the residents of the city and the state, the need for new industrial development to revitalize local industries, the 
economic boost the proposed project would provide . . . .”).  
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Yet another similarity that Poletown has with Kelo is that the neighborhood did 
not suffer from blight, was not a slum, nor did it pose any other hazard to the 
community.95  Both neighborhoods, however, did suffer from one commonality--they 
happened to be located in areas that large politically-connected corporations, namely 
Pfizer Corp. and General Motors, respectively, wanted for their own ends, regardless of 
the spill-over benefits to the community.  
For instance, in Poletown, Judge Ryan included in his dissenting opinion 
correspondence from GM to Mayor Young of the city of Detroit that detailed the extent 
to which General Motors’s hand was involved in the destruction of Poletown.  According 
to the correspondence, GM conceived the project, dictated the site where the Cadillac 
plant was to be built and the deadlines by which it was to receive title to all of the land 
seized in Poletown, directed how costs involved in clearing the site and making 
improvements to it were to be allocated, and demanded 12 years of property tax 
abatements.96
 More than 20 years later, it appeared that Pfizer and New London had absorbed 
the lessons of Poletown, as there was no “smoking gun” correspondence that detailed the 
extent to which the parties were intertwined in the taking of the petitioners’ homes in Fort 
Trumbull.  Nonetheless, it was clear to Justice Thomas that the project, located adjacent 
to Pfizer’s $300 million newly-built research complex,97 was “suspiciously agreeable to 
the Pfizer Corporation.”98   Indeed, in a review of documents dating from 1997 
concerning the project, Pfizer, like GM, was involved from the plan’s inception, and it 
detailed a “vision” for the Fort Trumbull area that involved replacing the neighborhood 
with upscale housing and office space to mesh with the Pfizer campus.99
More startlingly, is that several former high-ranking state officials confirmed that 
Pfizer demanded that Connecticut replace Fort Trumbull or else it would not build the 
multi-million dollar Pfizer facility.100   The reason for this demand was that, as one 
official noted, Pfizer wanted to ensure that the PhD’s that it wanted to attract to work in 
its adjacent research complex and who would be making $150,000 to $200,000 annually, 
felt comfortable in the neighborhood and enjoyed a high quality of life.101  The husband 
of a former president of the New London Development Corporation, who was a Pfizer 
executive, was notably quoted in a Connecticut newspaper as saying that, “Pfizer wants a 
nice place to operate.  We don’t want to be surrounded by tenements.”102
95
 Mansnerus, supra note 67, at 418 (supporting the lack of blight and sub-standard conditions in Poletown); see 
also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (noting that the Petitioners’ homes in Kelo were “well-maintained” and yielded 
no kind of social ill).  
96 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 466-71 (Ryan, J., dissenting).  
97 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.  
98 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
99
 Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1.
100 Id. 
101 Id.
102
 Jane Ellen Dee, Oh, Claire You’re a Scholar and a Visionary....If Only You Could Quit Leaving Skin on the 
Sidewalk, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at 5; see also Barry Yeoman, Whose House Is It Anyway?, AARP 
Magazine Online, Nov. 3, 2005, http://www.aarpmagazine.org/money/whose _house_is_it_anyway.html.  In 
addition, the building for the more politically-connected Italian Dramatic Club was spared condemnation.  
Izaskun E. Larrañeta, New London, Conn., Development Group Accused of Pushing Too Hard for Pfizer, THE 
DAY, Aug. 14, 2001, at B1.  Despite these developments, Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurrence to Kelo that 
the trial court had heard testimony from parties involved in the deal, examined letters, e-mails, and other 
correspondence between them, but concluded that Pfizer was not the prime beneficiary of the plan. Kelo, 125 
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The cost to taxpayers for both Kelo and Poletown has been enormous.  In 
Poletown, the price tag to local, state, and federal taxpayers was upwards of 
$200,000,000.103   The expense to taxpayers has been similar in Kelo, where in addition 
to the $118 million in financial incentives that Connecticut and New London offered to 
Pfizer to build its facility, the state has spent an additional $73 million from bonds for the 
redevelopment of Fort Trumbull.104
In spite of these massive costs to the taxpayer and the “sustaining hand” of GM 
and Pfizer, both the Poletown and Kelo majorities justified the takings of the 
neighborhoods by pointing to the public benefits to the community that would result from 
the economic development projects and supplant the neighborhoods, the GM/Cadillac 
plant in the former and the large-scale, mixed-use redevelopment project in the latter.  In 
neither case, however, did the courts verify or inquire into whether these benefits would 
likely take place.  In both cases, the public benefits were speculative.    Indeed, in the 
case of Poletown, the promise made by GM and Detroit was that “at least 6,000 jobs” 
were to be created by replacing the neighborhood with a Cadillac plant.105
 Reality, however, proved a different matter.  The GM plant ended up opening 
two years late.106  In 1988, seven years after the condemnations of the neighborhood, “no 
more than 2,500 workers”107 worked there.  Moreover, in 1998, at the apex of the 
economic expansion of the 1990s, only 3,600 workers were employed at the plant, a 
figure equivalent to less than 60% of the 6,150 jobs initially promised.108    In addition, 
with the closing of small businesses located in Poletown, there is an argument that 
Detroit actually suffered a net loss of jobs and that the condemnation of the neighborhood 
“did the people of Detroit more harm than good.”109
The current economic health of GM is reason enough why Kelo should be re-
examined, and it illustrates the futility of relying on illusory benefits of using economic 
development as a pretext to take someone’s home or business.  For instance, because of 
GM’s decreased market share, which many attribute to the carmaker’s inability “to make 
cars that people want to buy,”110 GM announced in November 2005 that it was 
eliminating 30,000 jobs and fully and partially closing a dozen plants.111  In addition, GM 
lost $8.6 billion in 2005, providing a reason for the termination of 30,000 people.112
GM, however, is not alone in its economic woes.  All three of Detroit’s Big Three 
automakers, including Ford and Chrysler, have eradicated or have plans to eradicate 
S.Ct. at 2669-70.  In addition, Justice Kennedy pointed out that even the justices on the Connecticut Supreme 
Court that dissented had agreed that the plan was not “to serve the interests of Pfizer . . . or any other private 
party.” Id.
103 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464 n.15.
104
 Mann, supra note 99.
105Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 467-68 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing Mayor Coleman Young’s statement and 
referencing the correspondence from Thomas A. Murphy, Chairman of the Board of General Motors to Mayor
Young (Oct. 8, 1980)).   
106 JONES AND BACHELOR, supra note 82, at 218. 
107
 Marie Michael, Detroit at 300:  New Seeds of Hope for a Troubled City?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Jul/Aug. 2001, 
at 25.  
108 Id.
109
 Somin, supra note 78, at 1017 (emphasis added).  
110
 Maryann N. Keller, Dull at Any Speed, WASH. POST., June 12, 2005, at B1.  
111
 Micheline Maynard and Vikas Bajaj, Ford to Cut Up to 30,000 Jobs and 14 Plants in Next Six Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A1. 
112
 Michael Ellis, Ex-GM Spokesman Returns, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 1, 2006, at 6F.
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86,000 jobs, or one-third of their work force in North America.113  Moreover, Detroit’s 
auto industry’s bonds have been “downgraded to junk.”114
Perhaps cognizant of the inherent vagaries of the marketplace and the resultant 
instability on which economic development takings rest, the Michigan Supreme Court, 
therefore, reversed Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,115 only a year before the 
U.S. Supreme Court seemingly “upheld” the decision in Poletown, almost 25 years later.    
Hathcock involved Wayne County’s decision, a county that includes Detroit, to condemn 
19 parcels of land, for the construction of Pinnacle Project, a business and technology 
park that was anticipated to create 30,000 jobs and yield $350 million in new tax 
revenues for the county.116  Wayne County argued that Pinnacle Project would create 
jobs, grow the tax base, stem population loss and disinvestment in the community, and 
provide fertile ground for additional re-development.117  The Hathcock court
acknowledged that these four public benefits were in harmony with the Michigan statute 
under which eminent domain was exercised by the County,118 but ultimately they were 
inconsistent with the Michigan Constitutional requirement that eminent domain be 
exercised only for a “public use.”119  Like Justice Thomas in Kelo,120 the court further 
noted that almost every use of real property by a business or “productive unit” benefits 
the community.121   According to the court, to justify the use of economic domain 
because a particular profit-seeking private party would put the land to “better use,” in the 
form of more money to the public purse and more jobs to the community, eviscerates the 
restrictions imposed on eminent domain by the Michigan Constitution.122
 Thus far, the economic benefits promised as a result of the condemnations in 
Kelo have been just as illusory as those promised in Poletown.  The public outcry against 
the takings in Kelo has left investors wary of building on land that has become a potent 
symbol of eminent domain abuse and left the petitioners in Kelo confident enough to stay 
in their houses and even to renovate them.123  Moreover, “contract disputes and financial 
uncertainty” have marred plans to construct in previously cleared areas of Fort 
113 See Maynard and Bajaj, supra note 111, at A1.
114 Editorial Desk, Trying to Find the Road Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A20; see also Moody’s Cuts 
G.M.’s Credit Rating Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at C15 (noting that Moody’s Investors Service reduced 
the automaker’s debt to B2 from B1, five levels beneath investment grade, making it much more expensive for 
G.M. to borrow money and to improve its profitability).
115
 684 N.W. 2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004) (“Our decision today does not announce a new rule of law, but rather 
returns our law to that which existed before Poletown . . . .”).   
116 Id. at 770.  
117 Id. at 775-76.  
118 Id. at 770; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS 213.23 (1998) (stating that “any public corporation or state agency is 
authorized to take private property necessary for a public improvement or for the purposes of its incorporation or 
for public purposes within the scope of its powers for the use or benefit of the public.”).  
119 MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (1963) (stating that “private property shall not be taken for public use”).  
120 See supra notes 56-63 in Part II.B. regarding Justice Thomas’ dissent.
121 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.  
122 Id.  The Hathcock court also outlined three general categories, tracking the criteria outlined in Justice Ryan’s 
Poletown dissent, that fit within the Michigan Constitution’s “public use” limitation: 1) if there is a public 
necessity that warrants use of eminent domain, including “instrumentalities of commerce” such as railroads, 
highways, and canals; 2) if the eventual private owner of the property is subject to public accountability in the 
property’s use; and 3) if the condemnation itself is a public use, such as when slums or blight is eliminated.  See 
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-83; see also Lewis, supra note 8, at 367-68. 
123
 William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21 
2005, at A1.
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Trumbull.124  Indeed, the Mayor of New London has publicly questioned the viability of 
the re-development of Fort Trumbull for at least the next two years.125  Therefore, in such 
times of economic flux, declines in market share, and investor pull-outs and hesitation, 
terra firma was one of the last things upon which homeowners and small business owners 
could plant their feet, but under Kelo, however, even the ground is not so firm.  
IV.  A New Framework
A.  Corporate Influence
The Supreme Court’s failure to provide courts with a clear definition of what sort 
of “comprehensive, integrated, or balanced” economic development plan would be 
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, combined with its position of extreme 
deference to legislatures that over which large corporate interests often exert great 
influence, leaves the floodgates wide open for abuse by large private interests that are 
often the “sustaining hand” behind many economic development takings.  Furthermore, 
the Court’s refusal to require evidence from the government that the promised theoretical 
public benefits of the taking, whether in the form of increased jobs and tax revenues, will 
yield actual equivalent benefits to the community further perpetuates the ability of 
corporate entities to enjoy the advantages of their cozy relationships with legislators and 
municipal leaders, to the detriment of ordinary citizens.  
Abuses of this sort were seen in Poletown and in Kelo,126 but the list, however,
runs long.127  For instance, in 2001, a federal district court in California granted plaintiff 
99 Cents’ motion for summary judgment128 after the city of Lancaster, California, had 
initiated condemnation proceedings on property in which a 99 Cents Only store had a 
leasehold interest.129 Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco) had previously demanded 
that it be allowed to expand its store on the space occupied by 99 Cents.130  Viewing 
Costco as an '"anchor tenant”’ and fearful of Costco’s relocation to another city, 
Lancaster put forth a proposal to expend $3.8 million of taxpayer money to purchase the 
leased property from the owner, relocate 99 Cents at taxpayer expense, and sell the 
property to Costco for $1.00, though there was no evidence that the 99 Cents store was 
124 Id.
125 Id. (“Winning took so long that the plan may not be as viable in 2005 or 2006 or 2007.”).   
126 See supra Part III.D., notes 95-102. 
127 See generally Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain:  A New Resource for Fighting Eminent Domain 
Abuse (Apr. 2003), www.castlecoalition.org/report.  This comprehensive report compiles the condemnation or 
threat of condemnation of more than 10,000 properties in 41 states from 1998 to 2002.  In addition, in his 
concurring opinion in Kelo, Justice Kennedy wrote, that allegations of “impermissible favoritism to private 
parties” should be treated seriously by the courts, but that in many cases, including Kelo, the record indicated no 
such preferences.   Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669-70.  On the other hand, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a stricter 
test might be warranted for instances where “the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties” is 
so “acute” that a taking would be invalid under the Public Use Clause. Id. at 2670.  However, Justice Kennedy 
declined to hypothesize what sort of instances may warrant this stricter scrutiny. Id.
128
 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp.2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2001) (aff'd by 
60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003)).
129 Id. at 1126.
130 Id.
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blighted.131 To the court’s credit, it placed the brakes on this economic development
project, tainted as it were by corporate influence.  
Another contemporary example of the inordinate corporate influence on takings is 
exemplified in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City 
Environmental, L.L.C.132 in which an Illinois court struck down a development 
authority’s (SWIDA) exercise of eminent domain on behalf of a private racetrack 
operator that needed more parking.133  Conveniently, the racetrack found it cheaper to 
petition the government to take an adjacent landowner’s property for ground parking, 
instead of building a parking garage on its own property.134 As a result of the 
development authority’s action, the racetrack’s revenues were expected to increase to up 
to $14 million.135  The court also noted that SWIDA, as an agent of the government, 
advertised that, for a fee, it would condemn land “at the request of ‘private developers’ 
for the ‘private use’ of developers.”136
Yet another case in which courts have acted to counteract the expansive influence 
of large corporate interests in economic development takings involved the condemnation 
of two small businesses and an elderly woman’s home by the New Jersey Casino 
Redevelopment Authority.137  Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino, owned by Donald Trump, 
had successfully petitioned the Redevelopment Authority to condemn the landowners’ 
properties because Trump Plaza needed limousine parking.  The New Jersey court held 
that the limousine parking was a public use, but that the taking was simply a pretext for 
giving Trump a “blank check” to it, including the addition of more casino space, without 
oversight by the government.138  Here again, it was the judicial branch that stepped in to 
check the imbalance of power in the legislative and executive branches.  
A recent case that has been placed on the fast-track post-Kelo and that is currently
attracting significant media attention, is equally illustrative of the vast power that large 
corporate interests can have on municipalities and states.  The city of Oakland has evicted
two small businesses, Revelli Tire and Autohouse, from land that the businesses own, as 
part of a redevelopment of the city.139  This development is expected to cost $61 million 
to taxpayers, and it will consist of, in part, a Sears store that would also include a tire 
store.140
131 Id.
132
 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (hereinafter SWIDA).
133 Id. at 4.  
134 Id. at 10.  Previously, the racetrack operator benefited from the issuance of $21.5 million in revenue bonds by 
SWIDA that had been lent to the operator to finance the construction and development of the racetrack. Id. at 3.  
135 Id. at 25.
136 Id. at 23.  The fee included a $2,500 application fee and a $10,000 down payment to be applied to SWIDA’s 
fee for taking the property.  Other parts of the deal were the racetrack’s agreement to pay for the price of the land 
and all other expenses that SWIDA incurred in the acquisition.   
137
 Casino Redevelopment Authority v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. 1998).  
138 Id. at 111.  
139
 FOXNews.com, Oakland Seizes Land, Swaps Retailer (Nov. 4, 2005), 
www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,174519,00.html; see also Jim Herron Zamora, City Forces Out 
Two Downtown Businesses, SFGate.com (July 2, 2005), http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file+/c/a/200507/02BAGO4DI6GJ1.DTL (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
140 FOXNews.com, Oakland Seizes Land, Swaps Retailer (Nov. 4, 2005), 
www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,174519,00.html; see also Jim Herron Zamora, City Forces Out 
Two Downtown Businesses, SFGate.com (July 2, 2005), http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file+/c/a/200507/02BAGO4DI6GJ1.DTL (last visited Nov. 17, 2005). Other cases have involved
the unsuccessful threat of eminent domain over small businesses and homes to make way for a Wal-Mart in 
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B.  Creative Solutions
Despite these instances of abuse of ordinary citizens and the implications thereof 
in the wake of Kelo, this paper, unlike others however, does not advocate a categorical 
ban on economic development.141 If economic development takings were banned, cities 
may respond by retaining ownership of seized land, but “contracting it out” via leases to 
Ogden, Utah, that was projected to yield $1 million per year in additional sales tax revenue, and would have cost 
taxpayers $2.1 million to move residents and to clear the land, but for which landowners complained Ogden was 
offering below-market rates and that two Wal-Mart stores were located within a 10- minute drive of the proposed 
site.  See Lynn Arave, Y’all Come! Ogden Leaders Eager to Get a Wal-Mart, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov. 
14, 2004, at B-3. Another example of the undue private influence in economic development takings akin to 
Poletown and Kelo was found in Mesa, Arizona, in which an Arizona appellate court struck down the 
condemnation of two small businesses, as inviolate of the “public use” restriction in the Arizona Constitution, 
that were slated for redevelopment after the owner of a neighboring Ace Hardware store, who came from a 
prominent family in Mesa, requested that the sites be included in the redevelopment project so that he could 
expand his hardware store on the new site, together with a large retail center that would have offered stores, 
offices, and eating establishments. Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), and Berliner, supra note 
127, at 16.  In addition, in Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331-33 (N.Y. 1975), the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed the condemnation of land by the city of Yonkers’ Community Development 
Agency that initiated proceedings to transfer land to Otis Elevator Company, a leading employer in Yonkers that 
“openly expressed a desire to acquire” it, though Yonkers was to subsidize the acquisition and the City had made 
no more than a “bare pleading” that the area in which the land was located was “substandard.” See also Hous. 
and Redev. Auth. for Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. 2001) (affirming the trial 
court’s holding to uphold a condemnation order of an auto dealership for a blighted area because of the closeness 
of the auto dealerships to residential areas, though the land was to be transferred to Best Buy to build a store).  
Moreover, in 2000, the city of New Rochelle, New York, took steps to declare a neighborhood of 34 homes, 160 
primarily elderly residents, 29 businesses in which over 400 individuals worked, and two churches, “blighted,” 
based on a study paid for by Ikea, in order to make way for an Ikea store that the company had projected to bring 
$2.5 million in annual sales tax revenue.  Cognizant of New Rochelle’s past unsuccessful ventures with 
economic development takings, in which the City cleared downtown land in the 1960’s for a mall that closed in 
the early 1990’s but re-packaged ten years later as an “entertainment and retail complex” and in which the City  
cleared property around its train station in the late 1980’s for a condominium project that never got off the 
ground, residents protested and Ikea later backed out of the deal. See Debra West, Ikea Wants to Move In, but 
Neighbors Fight Moving Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2000), at B1, and Winnie Hu, Ikea Cancels Plans for Store In 
Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at B1.  In a similar project, the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, wanted 
to take 64 downtown buildings that included “restaurants, flower shops, and a 144-year-old optometry business,”
to be replaced by a $500 million retail project that would have yielded $181,000 more in annually property tax 
revenues at a cost of $70 million to taxpayers. Eminent Thievery, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2001, at A26.  The 
project was halted after Nordstrom, a proposed anchor tenant of the project, chose not to pursue the deal. 
Eminent Thievery, at A26. The venerable New York Times has also been the recipient of eminent domain 
largesse from the government in the form of the Empire State Development Corporation. David W. Dunlap, 
Blight to Some is Home to Others: Concern over Displacement by a New Times Building, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2001, at D1.  The development corporation condemned a city block in Times Square for construction of a new 
New York Times building, forcing the removal of countless businesses, a dormitory, and hundreds of homes, at a 
cost of over $500 million in taxpayer subsidies. Dunlap, at D1.
141 See Somin, supra note 78, at 1007 (discussing the need for a “categorical ban” on the use of eminent domain 
for economic development as a way to alleviate the problems posed by Poletown).  Supreme courts in at least 
three states have banned economic development takings including Michigan in Hathcock, supra note 115, 
Illinois in S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl. L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2002), in which the court 
dismissed the economic development justification because “every lawful business” adds to the economy, and 
Kentucky in Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Ky. 1979) (brushing aside economic development 
justifications for the use of eminent domain because  “[e]very legitimate business, to a greater or lesser extent, 
indirectly benefits the public by benefiting the people who constitute the state.”). See also Somin, supra note 78, 
at 1009-10.  
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powerful private interests for private development.  Such arrangements are already 
common practices in other contexts, such as when cities or their airport authorities enter 
into restaurant leases with private parties in airports, or when they enter into contracts for
private garbage collection services.   Also, there may be legitimate instances in which 
governments may use eminent domain for the right kind of economic development.
Other scholars have argued that strict scrutiny should be applied to economic 
development takings as a way to guard against the exploitation of the average citizen.142
These scholars assert the idea that the taking of a home is more than an ordinary 
economic right deserving of only rational basis scrutiny, but one that is a fundamental 
right because of the “personal element” in a home.143  They argue that an individual’s 
interest in his or her home is one akin to life or liberty under the Due Process Clause.144
Although cognizant of other proposals designed to address the power inequities in 
economic development takings between average citizens and large corporate interests, 
this paper will advocate a different framework.  Not only may there be legitimate 
situations in which eminent domain should be used for economic development, but also 
the Supreme Court has explicitly affirmed the use of the rational basis test to scrutinize 
economic development takings.  The Court has, therefore, implicitly rejected a strict 
scrutiny test.  
From the outset, however, it appears that regardless of the theoretical answers 
proposed to address the imbalance of power in these sorts of takings, as a practical matter 
there are a number of creative solutions to which the parties themselves, the landowner 
and the large corporate interest, without interference by the judicial system could agree.  
The advantage of more creative answers is that they may result in a balancing of the 
eminent domain scales between the average landowner, who must pay doubly with his 
home or small business and for taxpayer subsidies of economic development, and the 
government and large corporate interests.  On the other hand, these solutions may likely 
be more time-consuming, given the need to think creatively instead of linearly, and more 
expensive for government, and ultimately for tax-payers, and large corporate interests 
with deep pockets. However, these characteristics may serve to force developers and 
government to consider carefully all of the ramifications of their plans.  
  For instance, an obvious resolution is one that would establish a premium price, 
above fair market value, for takings of homes.145  This premium would take into account 
142
 Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law:  An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the 
Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 311-14 (2000); see also 
Kruckeberg, supra note 85, at 570-73 (comparing the deprivation of one’s property to the loss of life or liberty, 
thereby meriting strict scrutiny); see also Ralph Nadar and Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 
VILL.L.REV. 207, 224 (2004) (discussing the need for application of strict scrutiny in cases involving eminent 
domain when land is transferred by the state to a private party, the landowner’s interest in the land is 
“particularly strong” because, for example, on it is his or her home, and money could not “significantly 
compensate” the owner for the loss, and the landowner is “relatively powerless politically.”); see also Jonathan 
N. Portner, Comment, The Continued Expansion of the Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 17 U.BALT. 
L. REV., 542 (1988); see also Mansnerus, supra note 67, at 444 (arguing that “the exercise of eminent domain for 
third-party use requires at a minimum full review for rationality” and the review should entail the application of 
an objective, over a good-faith test, that would likely require “a full factual hearing.”).  
143
 Jones, supra note 142, at 309. 
144 Id.
145Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, SANTA CLARA LAW REV, Vol. 46, (forthcoming Jan. 2006) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=801245.
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the sentimental or personal value of “home,” including one’s neighborhood and 
community,146 a value that is often more than the market would assign and that is placed 
on the property if the landowner is not a willing seller.147  The premium would also 
include reasonable costs of relocation or reasonable attorney’s fees should a legal 
challenge be mounted against a taking, and the cost of a similar home in a similarly 
situated neighborhood or area.148  For instance, the New York and Indiana Legislatures 
are deliberating legislation that would assess this premium at 25% and 50% above market 
value, respectively, for economic development takings.149   In addition, some scholars 
have proposed that the premium be tied, on a sliding scale, to the length of residence in a
home.150
Small-business owners would be similarly compensated for loss, not only for the 
fair market value of their land, but also for the value of their business’ good will, an 
amount that would correlate with the number of years the business had occupied the land, 
and the costs of relocation and construction of a similar building in a comparable area.151
Still other scholars have suggested that another creative solution, albeit expensive and 
likely impractical but in keeping with a truly free market system, would be to have 
landowners name their price and to require the state and large corporate interests to 
oblige.152
Without resorting to takings, an additional inspired solution to accumulate land 
for an economic development project would be to have landowners, whose property is 
slated for the development, to share in the profits that it would generate.153  There is 
precedent for just such an endeavor when in Atlanta, 39 African-American families were 
able to receive shares in the commercial development project that replaced their 
neighborhood.154
It should be remembered that countless successful economic development 
projects, such as Disney World,155  have been built without resort to eminent domain, 
though it is often cited as a necessary tool for redevelopment against individuals who 
attempt to “hold out” for the maximum price for their land.  However, when it comes to 
holdouts, Euclid, Ohio, tried an unusual but fresh approach.  When a developer that 
It is also important to note that the residents in Poletown received much less than they believed their homes were 
worth in the judicial settlement, and they did not receive payment for the cost of replacing their homes.  
Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 72.    
146
  Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 73.  
147
 Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988); see also JACK L. KNETSCH, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPENSATION:  COMPULSORY ACQUISITION AND OTHER LOSSES 36, 39, 40 (1983) 
(underscoring the notion that many landowners place a higher value, than that of the market, on their home 
because of emotional attachments to it and to their neighborhoods).   
148
 Barros, supra note 145, at 33; accord Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1869-70,  and Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 
73 (noting that the premium should include an amount related to the cost of construction of a “new building of 
the same size and style as the structure being condemned, possibly less a depreciation factor.”).
149
 Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA TODAY, at 1A.  
150
 Barros, supra note 145, at 33.
151
 Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 72-73.
152 Id. at 73.
153 Id. 
154 Id. (citing Roger Witherspoon, Profits Out of Thin Air in Johnsontown, BLACK ENTERPRISE 65-68 (Dec. 
1982)).  
155
 Roger Pilon, Kelo v. City of New London and U.S. Supreme Court Decision and Strengthening the Ownership 
of Private Property Act of 2005, Testimony before the US House Committee on Agriculture, Sept. 7, 2005; see 
also Somin, supra note 78, at 1026.  
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wanted to build a marina and a luxury high-rise development on Lake Erie was urging the 
city to use eminent domain on remaining holdout landowners, the city was well aware of 
the possibility of a public outcry from residents.  Therefore, the Mayor and a City 
Council member wrote a polite letter to remaining landowners requesting their 
cooperation and offering their willingness to meet with landowners in reaching a 
“satisfactory resolution.”156  The developer was able to secure almost all of the land that 
it needed.  Moreover, in exchange for one landowner selling an adjacent rental house and 
a vacant lot to the developer, he remained in his house while the development was built 
around him.157
In Pittsburgh, instead of resorting to eminent domain on a holdout 50-year-old 
pizzeria for the planned redevelopment of an old Sears store into a Home Depot, Home 
Depot agreed to house the pizzeria in its parking lot.158  Furthermore, in a similar move in 
Huntington Beach, California, after the city voted against using eminent domain to 
condemn a mall in favor of private developers, the developers included the discount 
retailers, most of whom opposed the initial project, in the Mediterranean-themed 
shopping center.159
C.  An Alternative Framework for Analyzing the Effect of Economic Development 
Takings On the Average Citizen:  Social Capital Impact Assessments
Despite the array of creative solutions that can be used to restore the balance of 
power in proposed eminent domain takings, the need for a new framework by which 
courts examine post-Kelo economic development takings, other than those already 
discussed in Part IV.B. is necessary, as the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected these 
solutions.160  It is likely that the floodgates of eminent domain abuse may open wide post-
Kelo as a result of  the combination of the following several factors:  1)  the current 
fervor by many “desperate” cities for downtown revitalization, 2)   the high degree of 
deference expressly accorded the legislature by the Supreme Court regarding economic 
development takings, though ordinary citizens have very little influence on the 
legislature, in contrast to well-financed politically powerful private interests,  3)   the 
Supreme Court’s failure in Kelo to define the largely opaque requirement of an 
“integrated, balanced, or comprehensive”  economic development plan, and 4)  the Kelo 
156
 Thomas Ott, Euclid Tried Polite Approach in Property Dispute, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 26. 2002, at B3.  
157
 Thomas Ott, Developers Offer to Let Holdout Keep House, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 20, 2002, at B3. 
158
 Lawrence Walsh, This Store’s Opening is Simply Grand; Home Depot Plays to Big, Enthusiastic East Liberty 
Crowd, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 11, 2000, at B1; see also Tom Barnes, Home Depot to Oust Smaller 
Businesses, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 1998, at A11.  
159 Property Rights Victories, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Nov. 26, 2000; at 2; see also Jim Hinch, Mall Project 
Seen as a Winner; Development- Huntington Hopes to Reverse a History of Plans Falling Through, ORANGE 
COUNTY REGISTER, Mar. 8, 2002, at 4. Other creative tools that government can use to encourage economic 
development, in lieu of eminent domain, include cutting red tape for building permits and property owners who 
wish to relocate, reducing fees for development application, and building around holdouts. See Jordan R. Rose, 
Eminent Domain Abuse in Arizona: The Growing Threat to Private Property, Arizona Issue Analysis, at 8-9 
(Aug. 16, 2002), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article.php/134.html. 
160 See supra Part IV.B. notes 141-44.
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Court’s refusal to hold municipalities and states accountable for the public benefits 
promised as a result of the economic development, in the face of striking evidence that 
the public benefits promised are not always yielded.      
In this new framework, it is evident that many economic development 
takings largely involve the taking of land owned by generally small groups of average 
citizens who are individual homeowners and/or small business owners.  Examples of 
these takings abound and include the petitioners in Kelo, 99 Cents,161 SWIDA,162 Casino 
Redevelopment Authority,163 Bailey v. Myers,164 and Richfield.165 Other examples include 
the owner of the Rivelli Tire Store that the city of Oakland wanted to replace with a 
Sears,166 the New Rochelle, New York, homeowners who resisted the taking of their land 
for an IKEA,167 the Ogden, Utah, residents who opposed the development of a Wal-Mart 
on their land,168 and the small business owners and residents displaced by the 
construction of a new New York Times building in Manhattan.169
It is logical that these economic development takings would occur, given that the 
cost of land in many of these areas is lower, often due to previous neglect by city leaders.  
Moreover, in the midst of the popular wave of revitalization, the land has been identified 
as valuable, because it is waterfront property, as was the case in Kelo,170 or because large 
corporate interests have identified the property as desirable, as evidenced in Poletown, 
Kelo, Casino Redevelopment Authority, Bailey, and Richfield, among others.   The 
individuals, however, that are impacted by this category of economic development 
takings are largely ordinary residents, those who may own their own homes and have 
small businesses, but who lack political influence with decision-makers, including 
municipal leaders that give the go-ahead to many urban revitalization projects, or state 
legislators that promulgate enabling statutes for eminent domain.   
Accordingly, given the current environment post-Kelo, an alternative solution 
would be one in which courts, or state or federal enabling legislation, would require the 
study of the social effects of economic development takings on these average citizens in 
the form of a social impact study.  Similar purely environmental studies, termed 
161 See supra notes 128-31.
162 See supra notes 132-36.
163 See supra note 137- 38.
164See supra note 140.
165 Id.
166 See supra notes 139-40.
167 See supra note 140.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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 Plans are in the works to use eminent domain to seize waterfront property in Riviera Beach, Florida, a 
predominantly African-American town and neighborhood. See generally Dennis Cauchon, Pushing the Limits of 
‘Public Use’, USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2004, at A03; Pat Beall, Riviera Beach Eminent Domain Case Draws 
National Spotlight, PALMBEACHPOST.COM, Dec. 11, 2005, 
www.palmbeachpost.com/localnews/content/local_news/epaper; John-Thor Dahlburg, An Eminent High Tide, 
LA TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005 at A12.  Similar plans are intended for the Cramer Hill section of Camden, New 
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Project), and  Dwight Ott, Camden Wants Judge to Revisit Cramer Hill Ruling, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 3, 
2006, at B03.
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Environmental Impact Studies (EIS) and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), are 
already prescribed in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.171
1. NEPA-EISs
Some view NEPA as an “environmental constitution”172 because it was 
promulgated to ensure environmental harmony and to avert damage to the environment173
by making information available to the public in an effort to compel federal “agencies to 
incorporate environmental values into their thinking.”174   The Act requires that all 
agencies of the federal government prepare an EIS on all “Federal actions [a project, 
regulation, policy, or permit issuance] significantly affecting the quality” of the 
environment.175   The EIS is meant to be an “action-forcing mechanism”176  and is a 
detailed statement on 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the 
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-
term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and 
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it 
be implemented.177
In addition, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has established regulations that 
implement NEPA.  The regulations mandate that the lead agency preparing the draft EIS 
make it available to the public and other agencies “early enough in the decision-making 
process for comments to meaningfully affect the agency’s decision,”178  to which the lead 
agency must subsequently respond in the final EIS.179   Because of the detail required, 
171
 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C § 4321-4375 (2006) (hereinafter NEPA).     
172 Jeannette MacMillan, Note, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in Domestic Environmental Law:  
NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks (Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 491, 494 (2005).
173 See id. § 4331.
174 JAMES P. LESTER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY:  THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 245 (1995).
175
 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). Some agency actions, however, may 
categorically require an EIS.  See Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2002).
176
 MacMillan, supra note 172, at 495.
177
 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 102.
178
 MacMillan, supra note 172, at 494; see also Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2006) 
(requiring that once an agency decides that it will undertake an EIS and before it publishes a draft EIS, it must 
publish a Notice of Intent that provides public participation in determining the “scope” of the EIS and significant 
issues related to it), and Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2006) (inviting comments by 
the public and other agencies).
179
 Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (2006) (requiring that the lead agency respond to 
the public’s comments); see also Brian Cole et al., Prospects for Health Impact Assessment in the United States:  
New and Improved Environmental Impact Assessment or Something Different?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
1153, 1162 (2004).
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EISs can be costly, ranging from “hundreds of thousands of dollars to several million 
dollars.”180   Moreover, in practice, EISs generally take one to two years, if not longer, to 
complete.181
Furthermore, the first step in the NEPA inquiry is an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) in which the agency will determine if its action will significantly impact the 
environment, thus triggering the need for an EIS.182   The public and other agencies are  
similarly invited to comment on the EA.183   In contrast to EISs, EAs are usually 
approximately 12 pages, and they do not include discussion of alternatives to a project 
and to incorporate scant analysis of environmental impact.184   If the agency determines 
that there is no significant impact after performing the EA, then it prepares a Finding of 
No Significant Impact (FONSI).185
i.  Judicial Review
NEPA provides no provisions for judicial review.  It has, therefore, been left to 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to review matters arising under NEPA largely 
using the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.186   In certain cases, the 
standard of review falls under a “rule of reason.”  These matters frequently comprehend 
an agency’s decision (1) not to prepare an initial EIS,187  (2) to perform an EIS, but one 
that certain interest groups deem is inadequate under NEPA,188  (3) not to compile a 
supplemental EIS,189  or (4) to perform an EA, but one that is similarly regarded by 
interested parties as insufficient under NEPA.190
180
 Cole, supra note 179, at 1163.
181 Id.
182
 Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2006).
183 Id.
184 Cole, supra note 179, at 1164.
185 Kern, 284 F.3d at 1067.
186
 MacMillan, supra note 172, at 407.
187 See, e.g., Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1330-32 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard when assessing the need for an initial EIS and ensuring that the agency has taken a “hard 
look” at the environmental consequences of its action in a case involving an agency’s decision to raise fishing 
levels of pollock without considering its effect on the population of the Steller sea lion in an EIS); Audobon 
Soc’y of Cent. Arkansas v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 433 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the Army Corps. of Engineers 
was required to undertake an EIS regarding its grant of a permit to build a bridge).
188
 This standard of review is the “rule of reason.”  See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. 332, 358-59 
(1989) (stating that “[i]t was surely not unreasonable for the Forest Service” to include a more developed 
mitigation plan of environmental effects in its EIS); Kern, 284 F.3d at 1071(noting that “[i]n reviewing the 
adequacy of an EIS, we employ a ‘rule of reason to determine whether the EIS contains a reasonably thorough 
discussion of the significant aspects of probable environmental consequences’”  that ensures that the agency took 
a “hard look” at the consequences) (citing Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 
1997)).
189
 This standard of review, like that which governs an initial EIS, is the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.  See, 
e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374-75 (1989) (noting that NEPA requires that 
agencies take a similar “hard look” at environmental consequences and that the Court will review this “hard 
look” under the “arbitrary and capricious” criterion).    
190
 For instance, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the “rule of reason” governs this decision of an agency under 
NEPA.  See Kern, 284 F.3d at 1970 (stating that “[a]n agency’s threshold decision that certain activities are not 
subject to NEPA is reviewed for reasonableness.”).
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 In general, however, “NEPA forces a process but not an outcome.”191 The 
process should be “fully informed and well- considered,”192  but ultimately courts are not 
able to make decisions on the substantive actions that may be taken, whether or not they 
would agree with the agency.193
ii. Assessment of NEPA
The EIS process in NEPA has been roundly criticized for being too burdensome, 
costly, and time-consuming.194 Other criticism has centered around NEPA’s heavy 
emphasis on process, to the detriment of substance.195  One scholar has noted that “[t]o 
this day, the Supreme Court has never decided in favor of a NEPA-plaintiff,” while lower 
courts have a more diverse history of rulings favorable to NEPA plaintiffs, but 
nonetheless constrained by the focus on process.196
However, Lynton Caldwell, the “intellectual father of EIS” and public 
administration professor,197  notes that although “NEPA has not come near to realizing its 
full potential,” its success in influencing decision-making regarding environmental policy 
should not be underestimated.198 Because of NEPA, federal projects have been 
reconsidered, redesigned, or even withdrawn, if the environmental consequences were 
simply too severe.199 For instance, projects that would have impacted old-growth forests 
or the northern spotted owl have been halted as a result of the EIS process.200
In addition, the public comment and information required in NEPA has given 
structure to public debate concerning projects of environmental import that otherwise 
would not have occurred without free disclosure.201   Indeed, this scrutiny has empowered 
environmental and community groups to participate in the decision-making process, a 
process from which they were excluded previously, and has contributed to their increase.    
Finally, NEPA has fostered more inter-agency cooperation on plans, and has provided 
more information to other potential decision-makers, such as legislators.202    Therefore, 
there is an argument that the challenges posed by NEPA are far outweighed by the Act’s 
benefits, namely the rise and empowerment of previously excluded environmental and 
community groups.  
191
 Cole, supra note 179, at 1170.
192
 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
193
 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
194
 MacMillan, supra note 172, at 521; see also Cole, supra note 179, at 1169.
195 See supra notes 193-94. 
196
 Macmillan, supra note 172, at 523.
197 Id. at 517.
198
 Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 205, 207 (1998).
199 Id. at 207.
200 See Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements and Their Lessons for Social Capital Analysis,  
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf at 2 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2005) (citing 
Mark Bonnet & Mark Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation:  The Endangered Species Act and the Northern 
Spotted Owl, ECOLOGY L.Q. 105-71 (1991), and Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (D. Wash. 
1988) (halting attempts to log the habitat of the northern spotted owl after it was declared a threatened species by 
the Fish & Wildlife Service)).
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 MacMillan, supra note 172, at 529; see also Caldwell, supra note 198, at 207.
202
 Caldwell, supra note 198, at 207; see also MacMillan, supra note 172, at 519-20.
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2. Social Capital Impact Assessments
Within a project that may have significant environmental consequences and thus 
triggers an EIS, Sander identifies several socioeconomic factors that may used to form a 
Social Capital Impact Statement (SCIS).203   This paper, however, proposes that many of 
Sander’s factors, as well as others identified below, could similarly be required in three 
possible ways with respect to economic development takings in a Social Capital Impact 
Assessment (SCIA).  First, courts, likely the Supreme Court, could mandate that SCIAs 
be performed and examined, in conjunction with an economic development plan, to 
ensure that the necessary consequences and alternatives are considered before embarking 
upon a potentially disastrous project.  Second, states could require, as part of their 
enabling legislation for economic development takings, that SCIAs be executed at an 
early enough time in a development proposal’s history to allow for meaningful public 
comment on a project. Presumably, this year is a perfect time for states’ considerations 
of this proposal, given the legislative reaction of 39 states to Kelo on the issue of takings 
for economic development.204   Third, SCIAs could be placed into not only any federal 
legislation contemplating restrictions on economic development takings,205 but also into 
federal enabling legislation for such takings that are applicable to Washington, D.C, as 
was at issue in Berman.206
i.  Components of a SCIA
SCIAs for economic development takings would likely include, at a minimum, a 
response to the following questions, with studies or data to support the answers.  Many of 
the following address the concerns outlined in Part III of this paper:  
1. How will the taking or development project disrupt 
existing land uses?;
2. How will the taking or development affect 
neighborhood integrity?;
203
 Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements and Their Lessons for Social Capital Analysis, 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf, at 3 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2005).  These 
socioeconomic factors are “1) Will the action affect neighborhood character and cohesion?,  2)  Will the action 
cause displacement and relocation of homes, families, and businesses?, 3)  For airport and highway projects, will 
surface-traffic disruption affect access to community facilities, recreation areas, and places of residence and 
business?, 4)  Will the action affect the quality of life of the residents of the area?, 5)  Will the action increase 
traffic flow and congestion? and 6)  Will the action divide or disrupt existing land uses?” Id.  Indeed, Sander 
infers that had a SCIS been incorporated into the EIS for Poletown, it might have proved helpful to the residents 
there. Id. at p.4.
204 See supra note 6.
205 See supra note 7.
206 See supra note 29.
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3. Will the taking or revitalization project displace and 
relocate homes, families, and businesses?; 
4. What opposition, if any, exists to the taking or 
project?;
5. If neighborhood integrity is to be affected or the 
taking or revitalization project is to displace homes, 
families, and businesses, how can these effects be 
mitigated?;
6. If displacement and relocation identified in 
Question Three occur, how many homes, families, and 
businesses will be relocated?;
7. If displacement and relocation occur, how many 
opportunities will there be for displaced residents to occupy 
space in the new development as a home or as a small 
business?;207
8. If there is no plan to have displaced residents 
occupy space in the new development as a home or as a 
small business, what proposals do the relevant government 
entities have to relocate residents or small business owners 
to an equivalent site?;
9. What is the economic impact of the displacement of 
these homes, families, and businesses on the city and 
state’s purse, in the form of lost real property and sales 
taxes, jobs generated by small businesses that may be 
displaced, and revenues generated by these businesses?;
10. What is the ethnic and racial breakdown of the 
families who may be displaced?;
11. What is the promised economic impact of the 
takings, in terms of employment opportunities and tax 
revenue gained?;  
12. Is the promised economic impact referred to in 
Question Eleven realistic and practical, in light of other 
potentially uncontrollable factors, such as the availability of 
financing for the project, key tenants and institutions that 
207
 Housing provisions in the new development plan for some of the displaced residents in Berman were 
specifically noted by the Court in that case.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31. At least one-third of the new residential 
units were to be “low-rent housing with a maximum rent of $17 per room per month.” Id.
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may occupy the project, or the economic health of these 
key tenants?; 
13. What ties, if any, do the private entities that stand to 
gain from the economic development project have with any 
state or local governments exercising eminent domain or 
promulgating legislation in support of its exercise?; and
14. What alternatives exist to placing the economic 
development project in the proposed site?   
ii. The SCIA Process
Just as with EISs in NEPA, SCIAs would incorporate pre-draft and draft versions, 
both to which the public and other decision-makers could respond.  They would also 
include final versions in which the entity seeking to use an economic development taking 
would respond to public comments.  In addition, provisions for supplemental SCIAs 
should be included, in case the initial assessment is inadequate.  Moreover, because of the 
fractured nature that eminent domain can take, especially with respect to economic 
development, it would likely be wise to incorporate public hearings as well as public 
comments at each stage of the process in order to allow meaningful input.  Furthermore, 
it is important to set a reasonable page limit on the SCIAs and ensure that the document 
is written in plain English in order for the public to understand it.  The fourteen questions, 
however, in Part IV.C.2.i. above could be further expanded and standards added to ensure 
a consistent process.  
Because of the need for this type of information, this paper advocates that SCIAs 
should be mandated by the courts or by the legislatures for all economic development 
takings.  On the other hand, there is the further argument that a mandatory process would 
only serve to increase bureaucratic red tape, engender resistance, and perhaps waste time 
and resources for economic development takings that might not have a significant 
impact.208
Standards for judicial review would depend on the goals of SCIAs.  Is the goal to 
ensure a process so that the public will have access to information and government and 
large corporate interests will have considered all relevant issues in an economic 
development project?  Or, is the goal to ensure a particular outcome?   Because courts 
have been reluctant to intervene substantively in NEPA cases, and as evidenced in Kelo
are even more hesitant to interfere in the legislative decision-making in economic 
development takings, this paper advocates that SCIAs focus on procedure.  This 
procedural concentration would encourage the availability of more information and 
would foment meaningful participation of previously excluded groups.
Therefore, if the goal is to ensure a process by which the public, government, and 
private beneficiaries of economic development takings will be more informed, then the 
208 See Cole, supra 179, at 1176 (supporting the use of Health Impact Assessments as part of EISs or as free-
standing documents).
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applicable standard of review could be that already used in assessing NEPA cases.  For 
instance, to assess the adequacy of a government’s SCIA, the “rule of reason” should be 
used.209 On the other hand, the judicial standard of review for a case in which it is argued 
that a supplemental SCIA is necessary would invoke an “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard.210
iii. Assessment of SCIAs
         SCIAs would likely inject more time, expense, and work for the parties involved 
and the courts that are charged with reviewing them.  However, given the checkered 
history of economic development takings and their failure to deliver the public benefits 
that were promised, as in Poletown and Kelo, the investment in a SCIA may be 
miniscule, especially when compared to the investment of taxpayer dollars that are used 
to support a project and the unnecessary bad will that is engendered.  By virtue of the 
time, expense, and public disclosure, SCIAs would provide incentives for government 
and private party decision-makers to consider thoughtfully and carefully the ramifications 
and consequences of their plans.  
         In addition, more information would be provided to the public, and average citizens 
would have more of an opportunity to participate and to influence economic development 
projects that call for the use of eminent domain.  The assessments would likely empower 
ordinary citizens, as NEPA has similarly empowered environmental groups.  Finally, 
SCIAs and the public scrutiny to which they would be subject would likely correct for the 
lack of political power and influence that average citizens do not have, especially when 
measured against that wielded by large corporate interests.
D.  Studies Performed in Kelo
In Kelo, two studies were performed.  One focused on the pure economic impact 
of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment project on the city of New London and New London 
County, a study that was commissioned by the New London Development 
Corporation.211 The second study212 was performed pursuant to the Connecticut 
Environmental Policy Act,213 and it required an Environmental Impact Evaluation 
(EIE)214 or a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) to be performed and submitted to 
and approved by the Connecticut Office of Policy Management.215
209 See supra notes 188, 19 0. 
210 See supra note 189.
211 See generally Fred Carstensen et al., The Economic Impact of the Pfizer and Fort Trumbull Development 
Projects, Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis, June 18, 2001, 
http://ccea.uconn.edu/studies/New%20London%20City%20Impact%20Study--Final%20Report.pdf (last visited 
on Feb. 18, 2006).  
212 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659 n.2; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Connecticut at *5, Kelo (No. 04-
108).
213 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1, et seq. (2005).
214
 According to Connecticut law, EIEs must detail the following: “(1) A description of the proposed action 
which shall include, but not be limited to, a description of the purpose and need of the proposed action, and, in 
the case of a proposed facility, a description of the infrastructure needs of such facility, including, but not limited 
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Because of the Fort Trumbull project’s impact on homes, Connecticut law also 
required that the EIE in Kelo examine the indirect and direct effects on housing, based on 
race and income levels of the residents in Fort Trumbull, as well as whether the impact 
on housing was consistent with the state’s long-term housing initiative.216   The 
Connecticut Office of Policy Management concluded that the economic development 
project did not conflict with the state’s housing goals.217
Connecticut’s inclusion of these social factors in the EIE, such as the project’s 
impact on housing categorized by race and income levels, is to be commended.  The 
inclusion of these social factors responds to Questions Three, Six, and Ten in the 
alternative framework of SCIAs.  Nonetheless, in comparison to the proposed alternative 
framework, the law does not delve into the deeper details of economic development 
projects, such as the influence that a private interest may have on it, any opposition that 
may be percolating against a project, and whether theoretical public benefits may mesh 
with what the public will actually receive.218
V.  Conclusion
The current explosion in urban redevelopment in many cities, as well as cities’ 
increasingly “desperate” measures to revitalize not only their downtowns, but also their 
bottom-lines through increased tax revenue, has created a situation of economic 
development takings that is ripe for abuse post-Kelo.   The lack of safeguards placed by 
the Supreme Court in Kelo, in the form of extreme deference to the legislature, a refusal 
to, parking, water supply, wastewater treatment and the square footage of the facility; (2) the environmental 
consequences of the proposed action, including cumulative, direct and indirect effects which might result during 
and subsequent to the proposed action; (3) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided and 
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources should the proposal be implemented; (4) alternatives to 
the proposed action, including the alternative of not proceeding with the proposed action and, in the case of a 
proposed facility, a list of all the sites controlled by or reasonably available to the sponsoring agency that would 
meet the stated purpose of such facility; (5) an evaluation of the proposed action's consistency and each 
alternative's consistency with the state plan of conservation and development, an evaluation of each alternative 
including, to the extent practicable, whether it avoids, minimizes or mitigates environmental impacts, and, where 
appropriate, a description of detailed mitigation measures proposed to minimize environmental impacts, 
including, but not limited to, where appropriate, a site plan; (6) an analysis of the short term and long term 
economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the proposed action; (7) the effect of the proposed 
action on the use and conservation of energy resources; and (8) a description of the effects of the proposed action 
on sacred sites or archaeological sites of state or national importance. In the case of an action which affects 
existing housing, the evaluation shall also contain a detailed statement analyzing (A) housing consequences of 
the proposed action, including direct and indirect effects which might result during and subsequent to the 
proposed action by income group as defined in section 8-37aa and by race, and (B) the consistency of the 
housing consequences with the long-range state housing plan adopted under section 8-37t.”   CONN. GEN. STAT.
§22a-1b(7)(c) (2005).
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“examined the economic, social, and physical impacts of the project.”  JONES AND BACHELOR, supra note 82, at 
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to hold cities and large corporate interests accountable for public benefits promised, but 
seldom yielded, and the “sustaining hand” of many large private interests in economic
development takings, is frightening to the average citizen faced with the threat of his or 
her home or small business being taken by eminent domain.  Given these factors, it is 
important that these takings be examined under an alternative framework.  
Social Capital Impact Assessments that are either mandated by the legislatures in 
enabling legislation or by the courts may allow average citizens to bridge the power 
inequities between them and the cities, states, and powerful private interests often behind 
eminent domain.  By providing the public with greater access to information at an early 
stage of an economic development project, greater choices will be provided to the public.  
As NEPA has proven, the average citizen will be empowered to exert influence over 
economic development projects in order to change or even to stop them entirely.  
